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Law and Reform of the International Economic System
By Chios Carmody

There is likely to be continuing discussion of reform in the international economic system
as Canada prepares to host two global leaders’ summits in 2010. Among topics currently
under consideration by G8/G20 heads of government are the adequacy of international
banking supervision, risk management, debt relief, a new global reserve currency, and the
structure of major international institutions (IMF, World Bank, WTO). What is the role of
law in this?
There are at least three considerations that governments and policy makers will want to
take into account in answering this question. The first is the landscape of international
economic regulation, which is today composed of a dense network of pre-existing
obligations concerning monetary affairs, international trade and development that need to
be simultaneously observed. Attention will have to be paid to ensuring that policies
pursued in different fields of international economic law are coherent and mutually
reinforcing.
A second consideration is the nature of the “problem structure” devised to deal with an
international economic issue as well as the nature of resulting “solution structure”. How
well a network of rights and obligations can be “fitted” on to a particular problem, and
how well soft law and informal mechanisms can be enlisted for the same purpose, will go
a long way to ensuring the effectiveness of any resulting legal regime.
Third, there is increasing recognition that international law works best when it is
accompanied by regular reporting and verification. Simply put, international legal
commitments function most successfully when the parties involved have a regular
opportunity to meet and discuss their behaviour, with the possibility of sanctions in cases
of non-compliance. Indeed, recent proposals for new mechanisms and regimes in
international economic law have foundered on exactly this point.
Each of the above issues requires some elaboration. Nevertheless, it is important to
remember that what we are focusing on here is the role of law. Many noted commentators
express the view that the chief role of law is to instill predictability, or what is sometimes
referred to as the protection of ‘expectations’. This purpose can be identified in the
IMF’s stabilization facilities, in the World Bank’s loan and good governance programs,
and in countries’ tariff concessions and service commitments under the WTO
Agreement.
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As we will see, however, predictability is introduced differently in different issue areas.
Generally speaking, it is easier for a country to make a negative commitment not to do
something than a positive commitment that binds it to behave in a certain way.
Negotiators will find it useful to consider which of these options a projected international
“obligation” will involve.
It is also helpful to understand on whom exactly the obligation in question will fall.
Today there is acute awareness that while states remain the principal subjects of
international law, other actors such as international organizations and NGOs are relevant
in the legal landscape and influence compliance. The success of the 1987 Montreal
Protocol to the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer is a case in
point. There, the global refrigeration industry was enlisted to eliminate the use of
environmentally destructive chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) as an industrial coolant. By the
mid-1990s use of CFCs was phased out worldwide – several years ahead of schedule.4 A
similar phase-out initiative has been introduced for single-hulled ships in the global oil
tanker industry.5 In both instances, the cooperation of a few key players was of critical
importance.
In any legal scheme there also needs to be a clear idea of who will possess the resultant
rights.6 Obligations create rights, but who will be in a position to enforce those rights can
often make a difference between the success and failure of an international regulatory
regime. In recent decades there has been a proliferation of judicial and quasi-judicial
mechanisms that seek to monitor and enforce compliance, that are either individual- or
collectively driven, and involve steps that are either hard and/or soft.7 In virtually all of
these schemes ‘perfect’ compliance is rarely feasible, or even desirable.8 The WTO’s
legal system, for instance, permits legal action by any WTO member country for the
breach of obligations by any other member, but the sheer range of obligations under the
treaty and the varying constellation of interests mean that few obligations will be
enforced to the letter. WTO members also recognize that there is a considerable
penumbra of non-compliance and ‘conspiracies of silence’ on certain sensitive issues,
leading to the observation that international economic cooperation under the WTO
Agreement is more a process than a result.
One further consideration about the role of law is that all legal systems must pay attention
it was observed that “the main purpose and objective of the WTO Agreement and the GATT 1994 is to maintain the security and
predictability of reciprocal market access arrangements manifested in tariff concessions. This, in our view, means that tariff
concessions must be interpreted to benefit both the importing Member, China, and exporting Members.”
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to factors beyond predictability. These can be thought of ‘realities’. A body of law
therefore works at reconciling the law of predictability with the flexibility required by
real conditions. A certain ‘pitch’ - or balance – is struck between these two goals. The
degree to which a legal system is able to achieve this balance successfully is an important
factor in its viability. For example, the International Center for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID) was created as an arm of the World Bank in 1965 to resolve
investment disputes between investors and host countries. In the last four decades it has
resolved hundreds of such disputes. ICSID has attracted widespread adherence, in part,
because arbitrators have refused to adhere to a one-size-fits-all definition of an
‘investment’.9 Instead, they have looked to national definitions or to definitions contained
within treaties, allowing a margin of appreciation that is considered respectful of national
sovereignty. ICSID’s ‘give’ in this respect been identified as an important factor in its
success.10
1. The International Economic System Today: A Dense Neighborhood
The existing landscape of international economic law is heavily built-up and, like the
core of a great city, constitutes a dense network of pre-existing structures. Introducing
anything new requires planning and consideration.
There are at least three ways of dealing with conflict of norms in international law. One
classic method is the latter-in-time doctrine (lex posterior) reflected in Art. 30 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.11 The doctrine holds that the most recent
international engagement on a topic governs the legal relationship between the parties.
However, trying to determine whether a new international agreement is, in fact, meant to
supersede existing obligations can be problematic.12 A second method is the ‘special law’
or ‘special rule’ doctrine (lex specialis) reflected in Art. 5 of the Vienna Convention.13
This doctrine holds that a more specialized international agreement prevails over a more
general one. Again, however, it can be difficult to determine if one engagement is more
specialized than another.14 Often the matter is left to be decided by characterization. A
third method is to provide a conflicts clause that 1. either accords a firm priority between
two international engagements or 2. avoids a straightforward priority and instead seeks to
coordinate application of the two sets of obligations. An example of prioritization are
rules under the WTO Agreement that give precedence to certain determinations of the
9
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IMF in monetary affairs that may have an impact on trade obligations.15 An example of
coordination is found in the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and
Agriculture, the preamble of which provides that it should not be interpreted as “implying
in any way that a change in the rights and obligations under other international treaties.”
It then expresses the understanding that this principle “is not intended to create a
hierarchy between this Treaty and other international agreements.”16
These relatively straightforward rules can give rise to issues of great complexity in
practice. Nevertheless, as Benedict Kingsbury has observed, coherence remains the norm:
“states have remained unitary enough on their legal policy to avoid conflicts of obligation
[and] the members of international tribunals have shown a commitment to systemic
coherence and to comity, and the sense of a unified legal system with a unified
international political order has generally been preserved.”17 Canadian policy makers
would therefore do well to think about how a new set of obligations could be inserted into
the existing landscape of international economic law in a way that coheres with and
reinforces pre-existing commitments.18
2. Regime Design
A second general consideration relates to the ‘design’ of a legal regime. Much attention
has been paid recently to means of optimizing the structure of rules and practices that
together form international regimes.
Generally speaking, the nature of the ‘problem structure’ arises from the way in which
the interests in question are to be conceived. If a particular problem is thought about as
disagreement over a ‘good’, then there are three forms of goods to be regulated: 1. private
goods, 2. public goods, or 3. ‘privatized’ versions of public goods. Private goods are
those considered to be held by countries individually, such as natural resources found
within territorial boundaries. Public goods are those that belong to states as a group or to
the international community as a whole (sometimes referred to as res communis), such as
the deep seabed or the ozone layer. Privatized public goods are those which exist in their
original form as belonging to states or humanity as a whole, but over which some form of
privatization is permitted. The introduction of market mechanisms in international law,
most evident in the Kyoto Protocol’s and Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and
Joint Implementation (JI) scheme19, is an attempt to harness the power of economic
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forces to meet international goals.
In designing a ‘solution structure’, consideration then needs to be given to the range of
interests that may be involved in exploiting the ‘good’ in question. One example from
domestic experience involves Canada’s West Coast fishing industry. Total allowable
catch quotas set by the federal government for the region during the 1980s led to
widespread dumping of unwanted fish, misrepresentation of catches, and the closure of
the groundfishery in 1995. The remedy for this initial failure involved re-opening the
fishery in 1997 but divided the coastal area into more than 50 sectors, assigning
transferable quotas, and requiring that all ships have neutral observers on board to record
catches.20
The design of solution structures in international law in future may draw on the work of
Elinor Ostrom, 2009 Nobel Laureate in Economics, who has highlighted how
communities in different parts of the world have evolved ways of managing public
property, or ‘common pool resources’.21 Ostrom’s work challenges conventional wisdom
that common property is poorly managed and should be either regulated by central
authorities or privatized. Based on numerous studies of user-managed fish stocks,
pastures, woods, lakes, and groundwater basins, she concludes that the outcomes are,
more often than not, better than predicted by standard theories. Resource users frequently
develop sophisticated mechanisms for decision-making and rule enforcement to handle
conflicts of interest.
An international level, the analogous task in relation to international economic law will
involve the assignment of rights and obligations in a way that is sensitive to both actual
and ideal notions of the ‘good’ involved. For instance, international attempts to discipline
the risk-taking activities of major financial institutions have not borne fruit so far because
of continuing disagreement over the appropriate point of regulation and limited
appreciation of international financial well-being as a single ‘good’.22 The central
problem is one of polycentric governance. Ostrom is clear that a broad diagnostic
framework is necessary and identifies a number of variables that are associated with selforganization.23 At the same time, she is clear that there are many efforts currently
underway to decentralize the management of public goods and that one-size-fits-all
solutions rarely succeed.
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See C.W. Clark, The Worldwide Crisis in Fisheries (2006). Since 1997 the Governments of Canada and B.C. have assigned
groundfish trawl quota to individual licence holders. To ensure that British Columbia's coastal communities continued to benefit from
the West Coast groundfish trawl industry a B.C. Groundfish Development Authority (GDA) was created. The GDA now administers a
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conditions, and encourage sustainable fishing practices. Under the scheme 10 per cent of individual vessel quotas are set aside by the
Minister of Fisheries to be allocated back to licence holders to reflect the interests of the communities and the labour force. An
additional 10 per cent is added to the licence holders' allocation at the start of each fishing season. On the advice of the GDA, a
portion or all of this quota can be withdrawn from the licence should the licence holder be found to be treating crew members in an
unfair manner. However, a report by Ecotrust Canada disputes the view that individually transferrable quotas are a panacea for the BC
and global fishing industry, noting that their implementation in the BC groundfishery has led to absentee ownership and quota leasing,
the development of a false sense of security to fishers, the facilitation of privatization and a growth in the capitalization of fisheries.
See “A Cautionary Tale of ITQ Fisheries”, available at www.ecotrust.ca/fisheries/cautionarytale (accessed Jan. 11, 2009).
21
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(2009).
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3. Reporting and Verification
For several decades the design of international regimes has been accompanied by a
realization that reporting and verification of international engagements is critical to their
success. The features of many modern treaty regimes, such as transparency, dispute
settlement and capacity building, matter little if they are not accompanied by what has
been referred to as “an iterative process of discourse among the parties, the treaty
organization, and the wider public.”24
Opportunities for meaningful communication between the parties matter immensely.
With communication comes the formation of a ‘we’, a collective ethos as well as
agreement over the boundaries of the collective good involved. The 'we' then being welldefined, countries are more likely to follow rules, to be cooperative and, occasionally, to
sanction one another in order to help the collective continue. The most extreme sanction
is obviously expulsion. At the same time, in the realm of international economic affairs
formal punishment rarely pays off. In most cases it will be largely symbolic. The example
of ineffective sanctions for failure to meet the Euro’s strict convergence criteria is a case
in point.25
A related observation is that policy making in the fi'lf gg international economic law
has`tO âu accompanie` r{ an authmnTic0qpirit of commitment. Thiq e`y
soufd Prétel(but policy making cannot be regazdE` as aî o2portunity for windowdresséngl0T(mre must be a genuioå¤i,vestment by governments in solttíons 4o
Flobal"0únC.ems. Here is where the promise a.d Qeril of the growing eîdhusiasM æ•r
‘metrifIcádion’
becomes
ipPerent.
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As part of the 1997 Stability and Growth Pact leading to the creation of a European Economic and Monetary Union in 1999, EU
member states agreed to two convergence criteria leading to the creation of a common currency: an annual budget of no higher than 3
percent GDP and national debt lower than 60 percent GDP. Several countries that are part of the Union later breached these criteria.
Punitive proceedings were begun against Portugal and Greece in 2002 and 2005, respectively, but fines were never applied.
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umCers can al,{wQzolicy makEró a`legree of control over An yssue, but only to the
extent that those numbers accuòctely disclgsE$the underlying stata •d things. If
they"dg!not, or )f Oumbers get turned into a(sOvt!oâ ‘game’ (as is arguably now
happening witx$'tmbal fishing 3toBks and with many /f Uhe Millenium Development
Goaló),bthen cynicism and disengagement Beçyn to tckm!over.26 There has to re`i
rgadhstic apPráysal of underlying proJlÅys and a$guluine willingness to do something
about thEm®0
4. Somå C-ncluDiîw Thoughts
In the early 19903 tIere(wAw a ‘boomlet’ of akaDamic interest in
implemejtqvioj,0aompliance and effectiveness studies related to international law.27 The
result has been a subsisting interest in ‘regime design’, even if the new international
institutions created in the aftermath of the Cold War have not always fulfilled their aims.
In thinking about the role of law, however, it is important to remember that perfect
compliance is rarely feasible and that shortcomings are often an opportunity to pinpoint
weaknesses and engage in fine-tuning. Awareness of the existing landscape of
international economic regulation, a clear idea of both the ‘problem-’ and ‘solutionstructures’ that are possible, and a regular framework of communication, are all essential
in the success of any regime of international economic law. Canadian and foreign policy
makers would do well to recall these points going forward in 2010.
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The Millenium Development Goals are a series of 8 goals established at the U.N. Millenium Summit in 2000 designed to radically
improve life conditions for the world’s least fortunate citizens by 2015. Early research completed by the UN Development Program
has shown that progress towards attaining success by the 2015 deadline is not promising. See Centre of Concern, “Where Are We
Now” in More than a Numbers Game? 14-21 (2005). Also Amir Attaran, “An Immeasurable Crisis? A Criticism of the Millennium
Development Goals and Why They Cannot Be Measured” (2005) 2(10) Policy Forum 955-9.
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See for instance Thomas Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (1990); Abraham Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes,
The New Sovereignty (1995). At the same time, a number of conferences on international law examined the subject of its
effectiveness. See for instance American Society of International Law, Proceedings of the American Society of International Law:
Implementation, Compliance and Effectiveness (1997).

